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Abstract
In this work, we present a learning-based ap-
proach to analysis cyberspace configuration. Un-
like prior methods, our approach has the ability
to learn from past experience and improve over
time. In particular, as we train over a greater
number of agents as attackers, our method be-
comes better at rapidly finding attack paths for
previously hidden paths, especially in multiple
domain cyberspace. To achieve these results,
we pose finding attack paths as a Reinforcement
Learning (RL) problem and train an agent to
find multiple domain attack paths. To enable
our RL policy to find more hidden attack paths,
we ground representation introduction an multi-
ple domain action select module in RL. By de-
signing a simulated cyberspace experimental en-
vironment to verify our method. Our objective is
to find more hidden attack paths, to analysis the
weakness of cyberspace configuration. The ex-
perimental results show that our method can find
more hidden multiple domain attack paths than
existing baselines methods.
1. Introduction
Rapid progress in AI has been enabled by remarkable
advances in computer systems and hardware, but it is
not widely used in cyberspace security protection. How-
ever, the intellectualization of cyberspace security protec-
tion system is an important problem facing the current cy-
berspace security protection(Rajkumar et al., 2010). In
the security management of cyberspace, actually the cy-
berspace should be regarded as a space composed of phys-
ical domain, digital domain and social domain, and its se-
*Equal contribution, order determined by coin flip.
curity protection should also be conducted as a whole(Lee
et al., 2016). In this process, it mainly includes the configu-
ration of intelligence discovery of weakness, intelligent de-
ployment of security equipment(Heo and Varshney, 2005),
intelligent monitoring of network traffic, intelligent aware-
ness of security situation and other parts(Yao et al., 2019),
which comprehensively constitute the cyberspace security
protection system. We believe that it is AI itself that will
provide the means to constitute the cyberspace security pro-
tection system, creating a symbiotic relationship between
cyberspace security and AI with each fueling advances in
the other.
In this work, we present a learning-based approach to anal-
ysis cyberspace configuration. Our objective is to find more
hidden attack paths, to analysis the weakness of cyberspace
configuration. Despite of research on this problem, it is
still necessary for human experts to realize the security
risks existing in the current cyberspace of accurate judg-
ment and evaluation, in order to ensure the security of the
entire cyberspace. The problems complexity arises from
multiple domain interaction each other in cyberspace, and
only digital domain or network domain can be considered
in current research. Even after breaking the problem into
more manageable sub-problems, the state space is still or-
ders of magnitude larger than recent problems on which
intelligent-based methods have shown success.
To address this challenge, we pose find multiple domain
attack paths as a Reinforcement Learning (RL) problem,
where we train an agent (as an attacker) to find the at-
tack paths. In each iteration of training, all of the attack
paths are sequentially found by the RL agent. Training is
guided by a fast but approximate reward signal for each of
the agents find attack paths.
To our knowledge, in order to realize the target, the follow-
ing problems need to be solved:
• First, the problem of multiple domain which can inter-
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action each other. This paper studies the problem of
multiple domain cyberspace, and changes the existing
cyberspace security risk analysis to focus on multiple
domain cyberspace, enforce the pertinence and rele-
vance of business level.
• Second, the problem of the alternative actions in dif-
ferent states is different. In traditional RL, the num-
ber of actions which agent can select is the same in
any state. Therefore, this paper introduction the multi-
domain action select module in RL algorithm, in order
to make the alternative actions in different states is dif-
ferent.
• Third, the problem is how to measure the cyberspace
weakness by multiple domain cyberspace attack paths.
This paper proposed an basic index measured by the
average attack paths of all attackers in the cyberspace.
In this way, we can measure the weakness of differ-
ent cyberspace configuration, thus provides the cor-
relation reference for the different cyberspace config-
uration, to help the administrator to improve the cy-
berspace security.
We believe that the ability of our approach to learn from ex-
perience and improve over time unlocks new possibilities
for network administrator. We show that we can achieve
superior result on simulated cyberspace experimental en-
vironment, as compared to the baselines method. Fur-
thermore, our methods can find more hidden attack paths
comparable to human expert based method in same time.
Although we evaluate primarily on cyberspace configura-
tion analysis, our proposed method is broadly applicable to
many cyberspace security analysis.
2. Related Work
2.1. Intelligent Security Protection
Intelligent security protection mainly studied the behavior
characteristics and rules of users network monitoring and
network optimization. In general, there is an attack in the
cyberspace, when it appears, the traffic will change, we can
take advantage of the attack mode type to detect cyberspace
anomalies. Collect the original message of the data in the
network and extract it. Take the destination address and
other information, establish the normal traffic model, and
then use discrete wavelet transform technology analyzes
and detects the data flow to judge the cyberspace anoma-
lies(Kim and Reddy, 2008) .
At present, the intelligent security protection technology
based on cyberspace user’s action mainly relies on web data
mining, user abnormal action detection and neural network
based method to distinguish.
Combining traditional data mining techniques with the In-
ternet for web mining is to extract potentially useful pat-
terns and hidden information from web documents, web
structures and service logs. Generally, according to the dif-
ferent objects of web mining, people divide web data min-
ing into three types: web content mining, web structures
mining, use record mining and web comprehensive min-
ing(Badea et al., 2015).
In the operation process of users will retain a lot of action
information, effective use of this information is the basis
and key to the realization of abnormal action determina-
tion. Multi-layer log collection is implemented to support
the decision of user access action. Using multi-level user
access log, and integrate web front end user click action and
URL access logic, to extract the user’s access action char-
acteristics, by a large number of calculating the average
user action baseline characteristics, use of effective mon-
itoring abnormal access action scoring algorithm, trace the
action of the abnormal IP, corresponding treatment mea-
sures(Beutel et al., 2015).
As an important method to deal with nonlinear systems,
the neural network method has been successfully applied in
the fields of pattern recognition and probability density es-
timation. Compared with the statistical analysis theory, the
abnormal behavior analysis method based on neural net-
work can better express the nonlinear relationship between
one variable and another. The changing of abnormal net-
work action requires the ability of behavior analysis system
to analyze a large number of network packets. Moreover,
many common attacks may be coordinated by multiple at-
tackers on the cyberspace, which requires the network ab-
normal action analysis system must have the ability to deal
with a large amount of nonlinear data. The method based
on neural network has a fast response ability, especially for
the processing of noisy data and incomplete data, so it pro-
vides a great flexibility for the analysis of intelligent secu-
rity protection(Kawazu et al., 2016).
In recent years, the emergence of machine learning has
made intelligent security protection become a new trend.
There are many new attempts, including SVM(Liao et al.,
2013)(Gao et al., 2017), K-nearest neighbors(Xu et al.,
2017), Naive Bayes(B and Muneeswaran, 2019), random
forests(Zhang et al., 2008), neural network(Akashdeep
et al., 2017), deep learning and so on. The methods based
on deep learning have become mainstream in the field be-
cause of their better performance. Gao proposed an model
based on deep belief network, which uses a multi-layer un-
supervised learning network and a supervisor-based back-
propagation network(Qu et al., 2017). Shone used asym-
metric depth self-encoders to learn network traffic charac-
teristics in an unsupervised, not only achieved good per-
formance on large data sets, but also reducing training
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time(Shone et al., 2018). Yin proposed a model using
RNN, compared the effectiveness of the non-depth model,
and achieved good performance(Yin et al., 2017). Kim pro-
posed a model using LSTM and gradient descent strategy.
The experiment result which proved the LSTM can achieve
a better performance(Le et al., 2017). Sheraz conducted a
comprehensive study on deep learning model, and proved
that the deep learning method can not only be used in this
field, but also can achieve better performance(Naseer et al.,
2018).
2.2. Reinforcement Learning
Reinforcement learning is commonly considered as a gen-
eral machine learning model, it mainly studies how agent
can learn certain strategies by interacting with the environ-
ment, to maximize long-term reward. RL is based on the
Markov Decision Process(MDP)(Sutton and Barto, 1998).
A MDP is a tuple (S,A,T,R, γ), which S is the set of states
and A is the set of actions. T(si|sj , a): T × A→R is the
reward after executing action a at stage si, and γ is the dis-
counting factor. We used pi to denote a stochastic policy,
pi(s, a): T× A→[0,1] is the probability of executing action
a at state s and
∑
a∈A pi(s, a)=1 for any s. The goal of RL
is to find a policy pi that maximizes the expected long-term
reward. Besides, the stateaction value function is
Qpi(s, a) = E [
∑∞
t=0 γ
tR(st, at)|s0 = s, at ∼ pi(st)]
(1)
which γ ∈ (0, 1] measure the importance of future reward
to current decisions.
For different policies pi, they represent the possibility of
different actions selected in the same state, and also corre-
spond to different rewards. A better policy can select better
action in the same state, to obtain more reward.
In traditional RL, the action-value function is calculated
interactively, and will eventually converge and obtain the
optimal strategy, mainly including Dynamic Programming,
Monte Carlo Method and Temporal-Difference Learning.
After deep learning was proposed, the deep reinforcement
learning method formed by combining RL is the main-
stream method at present.
In the following, we introduce the mainstream RL algo-
rithm DDPG.
Deep Deterministic Policy Gradient (DDPG):
DDPG(Lillicrap et al., 2015) is a learning method that
integrates deep learning neural network into Deterministic
Policy Gradient(DPG)(Silver et al., 2014). Compared with
DPG, the improvement the use of neural network as a
policy network and Q-network, then used deep learning to
train the above neural network. DDPG has four networks:
actor current network, actor target network, critic current
network and critic target network. In addition to the four
network, DDPG also uses experience playback, which
is used to calculate the target Q-value. In DQN, we are
copying the parameters of the current Q-network directly
to the target Q-network, that is θQ
′
= θQ, but DDPG use
the following update:
 θ
Q′ ← τθQ + (1− τ)θQ′
θµ
′ ← τθµ + (1− τ)θµ′
(2)
where τ is the update coefficient, which is usually set as
a small value, such as 0.1 or 0.01. And this is the loss
function:
L(w) =
1
m
m∑
j=1
(yj −Q(φ(Sj), Aj , w))2 (3)
3. Methods
The influence of cyberspace security is mainly reflected in
different cyberspace configurations, which can influence
the length or concealment of attack paths in cyberspace.
Different configurations in cyberspace can change at-
tacker’s attack paths in different ways. It is generally be-
lieved that cyberspace contains physical domain, digital do-
main, cognitive domain, social domain, etc. Since the re-
lationship between people and people in the social domain
generally changes in real time, it is not considered for the
time being. In this paper, the relevant configuration and
related authority of physical domain, digital domain and
cognitive domain are mainly considered.
After analyzing the relation between cyberspace authority,
namely can analysis the cyberspace configuration weak-
ness, its basic idea is if an attacker can find attack paths
under current cyberspace configuration. If under a certain
cyberspace configuration, the attacker can more easily find
attack paths, as a result, the attacker can easily modify the
cyberspace configuration and obtain the security informa-
tion, illustrates the cyberspace configuration is bad. On
the other hand, the security of cyberspace configuration
is necessary. So we proposed the method to analysis the
weakness of cyberspace, to find the attack paths to analy-
sis weakness in the current cyberspace, then enhance the
cyberspace security based the weakness analysis result.
3.1. The Weakness Analysis Architecture
The input of cyberspace configuration weakness analy-
sis architecture is the current cyberspace configuration,
through the malicious action analysis model to analysis
its possible malicious actions, get the attacker’s attack
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Figure 1. Cyberspace Configuration Weakness Analysis Architecture
paths, ultimately rely on the cyberspace multiple domain
attack paths, according to the cyberspace configuration in-
dex value, calculate the weakness of the current cyberspace
configuration. The architecture is shown in Figure 1.
This process is divided into two core processes, first is
through the current cyberspace configuration, we will get
the corresponding cyberspace attack paths based on the ma-
licious action analysis model, this is the most critical in this
process. In this process, we use the DDPG algorithm, and
represent an attacker as an agent. The agent can learning
cyberspace intrusion policy by its autonomous, and then
find the attack paths in cyberspace, therefore the agent can
find the hidden attack paths. Second is calculating the cy-
berspace configuration’s weakness, mainly through com-
pute cyberspace attack paths to calculate cyberspace con-
figuration weakness value. In the process, because of the
different attackers’ initial permissions, the cyberspace at-
tack paths is different, so we need to comprehensive anal-
ysis of different attackers, integrated to the cyberspace at-
tack path of different initial permission attackers, and cor-
responding the weakness of cyberspace configuration is ob-
tained.
3.2. Malicious Action Analysis Model
The main function of the malicious action analysis model is
to obtain the possible cyberspace attack paths of an attacker
who given its initial permission under a certain cyberspace
configuration. In this process, we use DDPG algorithm,
and the attacker with initial permissions are represented as
the agent, who can learn cyberspace intrusion strategy au-
tonomously and obtain cyberspace attack paths.
Specifically, the malicious action analysis model takes
DDPG algorithm, we are using an agent to represent the
likely attacker. In the process of finding the attack paths,
the agent first selects the action in the current state, which
can change the environment(cyberspace configuration) and
the agent’s state. At the same time the agent will obtain
certain reward, negative reward(captured by administrator)
or none. Besides, the change in the agent’s state enables
it to perform other actions to obtain more rewards. As a
result, the agent finds attack paths in this cyberspace con-
figuration by trial and error. The model is shown in Figure
2.
The goal of malicious action analysis model is to find an
Figure 2. The Malicious Action Analysis Model
optimal policy given a cyberspace state, and to select the
corresponding action a according to the current state s of
the cyberspace, it also means find the corresponding policy
mapping function R(s) → A, to make the long-term re-
ward of agent maximum. In this process, the policy can
be divided into two categories, namely the deterministic
policy and the stochastic policy, deterministic policy is for
the state, the conviction of corresponding output(action).
In general, the deterministic policy algorithm efficiency is
high, but the lack of ability to explore and improve. Rather
than the stochastic policy is based on deterministic policy,
to join corresponding random value, enables the stochastic
policy to have certain ability of exploration. For the ma-
licious action analysis model, since the action value range
is generally not large in practical problems, a determinis-
tic policy is adopted to ensure better performance of the
model.
The malicious action analysis model treats the problem as
a MDP, that is M = (S,A, P,R, γ), where is s ∈ S the
current state of the cyberspace, a ∈ A is an attack action
that is currently available, P is the probability of transi-
tions between states, R is the reward value after taking
an action to reach the next state. γ is the discount fac-
tor. For the transfer probability, it can be expressed for-
mally as p(sˆ|s, a) = p(St+1 = sˆ|St = s,At = a).
For the reward function, it can be formally expressed as
R(s, a) = E[Rt+1|s, a].
On the specifically model, the malicious action analysis
model is a standard RL model, through the study of the
awareness of environment, the agent will take the action
and get a reward, the goal of the agent is to maximize re-
wards, and then to further training of the agent. In this
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Figure 3. The Improved DDPG Architecture
paper, we will to take DDPG algorithm, and its main archi-
tecture as shown in Figure 3.
With the standard DDPG algorithm, the basic architec-
ture of the malicious action analysis model also consists of
four networks and one experience replay memory. Among
them, the experience replay memory is mainly responsible
for storing the state transfer process of< s, a, r, s′ >, then,
by means of small batch sampling, the corresponding trans-
ferred samples are extracted to train the corresponding neu-
ral network so as to avoid the strong correlation between
samples. Among the four networks, there are two pol-
icy networks(Actor) and two Q-networks(Critic), namely
the online policy network, the target policy network, the
online Q-network and the target Q-network. The policy
network mainly simulates the attacker’s policy through the
deep neural network, which takes the current state as the
input and the output as the corresponding action. The Q-
network is mainly used to estimate the expectation of the
final reward value obtained if the policy is continuously
executed after the current action is executed in a certain
state. The input is the current state, the current action and
the output is the Q-value. If only a single neural network is
used to simulate policy or Q-value, the learning process is
unstable. So in DDPG algorithm respectively, policy net-
work and Q-value network create copies of two networks,
two networks are known as the online network, two net-
works are known as the target network, online network is
the current training of network, the target network is used
to calculate the training goal, and after a short period of
time, the model of online networks parameter updates to
the target networks, so as to make the training process is
stable, easy to convergence.
We have improved the standard DDPG algorithm, which
is different from the standard DDPG algorithm in three as-
pects:
• In improved DDPG algorithm, we introduced the
multi-domain action selection module.
Different from standard DDPG algorithm, the biggest
change is that the introduction of multi-domain action
selection module. In the standard DDPG, the actions
which agent can choose in each state is the same. But
in this environment, when the attacker select the at-
tack paths in cyberspace, he have different alternative
actions in each state. In order to make DDPG algo-
rithm can choose different actions in different states,
joined the multi-domain action selection module. This
module’s input is online policy network’s output, the-
ory action at, then a linear change under this current
state, and perform the actual action a′t, the actual ex-
ecution action a′t into multi-domain action execution
module, get the corresponding reward r′t. In the end,
the corresponding actual execution of action a′t and
the corresponding reward r′t return online policy net-
work. Through this method, the reasonable choice of
actions in different states can be realized.
• Second, the input of experience playback memory is
different.
In order to ensure that the multi-domain action selec-
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tion conforms to the constraints of the actions on the
state, the input of the experience playback memory is
increased, not only by the online policy network to
store the sequence (st, at, rt, st+1), that is, execute
the action at in the statest, get the reward value rt,
and convert the relevant state to st+1. Moreover, since
the corresponding relationship between the state and
the action needs to be considered when selecting the
action, it is avoided that the policy network chooses
the action that is not feasible in the state. Therefore,
when the policy network selects an inoperable action
at in the state st, it is not only necessary for the multi-
domain action selection module to use a linear trans-
formation to map it to a feasible action a′t. In addition,
relevant action sequences (st, at,−∞, st+1) need to
be taken to indicate that actions at are executed in the
state st, and the subsequent state obtained is still st,
and the reward at this time is a huge negative value,
so as to ensure that relevant actions are not selected in
the process of training the policy network.
• At last, the architecture of the policy network is
changed based on the relevance of the input state.
In terms of network architecture, the two policy net-
works have the same architecture, whose input is the
state of network and output is the action to be selected.
Structurally, a RNN hidden node is added between the
original DDPG input layer and the hidden layer. The
transformed policy network is divided into 5 layers.
The first layer is the input layer; The second layer is
the RNN hidden layer, which contains 32 GRU nodes.
Layer 3th and layer 4th are the full connected layer, in-
cluding 48 full connected nodes. The activation func-
tion uses the ReLu function. The fifth layer is the out-
put layer, use the sigmoid function as the activation
function, and finally output a multi-dimensional vec-
tor representing the multi-domain action that needs to
be performed.
In addition, the two Q-networks have another architecture,
whose input is not only the state of the network, but also
includes a multidimensional vector, representing the corre-
sponding multi-domain actions, and the output is a scalar,
representing the corresponding Q-value of the correspond-
ing states and actions. The network is divided into four
layers. The first layer is the input layer; The second layer
and the third layer respectively contain 48 fully connected
nodes. The activation function uses the ReLu function.
The fourth layer is the output layer, which outputs a scalar
and uses the linear function as the activation function, rep-
resenting the corresponding Q-value of the corresponding
state and action.
3.3. Cyberspace Configuration Weakness Metrics
The measurement of cyberspace configuration weakness is
the basic index measured by the average attack path of all
users in the cyberspace, as shown in equation 4:
sec(s) = lim
n→∞
n∑
i=1
len(A(ui))
n
(4)
Among them, s is the multiple domain configuration of the
current cyberspace, which is the object to be evaluated;
sec(s) is the security measures configured for the current
multiple domain cyberspace; n is the number of attackers.
For the same attackers with different initial states, they can
be considered as different network attackers, ui is the user
i, A(ui) is the shortest attack path of the user i, len(path)
is the length of the path path. The attack path is the at-
tacker how he can get the security information from the
initial permission through the relevant steps.
By the equation 4 can be seen that for measurement cy-
berspace configuration weakness, can be turned into search
for the most likely attack paths, by this measure, the cy-
berspace configuration weakness metric into intelligence
agent to autonomous learning, to enhance the automation
of the cyberspace security configuration has the profound
significance.
4. Experiments
4.1. Experiment Environment
In the experiment, the corresponding simulation envi-
ronment is constructed to verify the effectiveness of the
method. In this environment, there are five spaces in to-
tal. The outermost space is the whole physical space, rep-
resenting a region. P1 is the region where terminal located,
P2 is the region where VPN equipment located, P3 is the
location of the communication team, and P4 is the commu-
nication hub. There are 5 kinds of equipment, including
computer 2 sets (T1 and T2, respectively stored in P1 and
P3), firewall 2 sets (FW1, FW2, respectively stored in P3
and P4), sensor (D1, stored in P2), router (R, stored in P4)
and switch (SW, stored in P4), server 2 sets (S1, S2, stored
in P4) and its equipment connection relationship as shown
in Figure 4. The security information is stored in S2.
In this network, there are 15 network services, as shown in
Table 1
In this environment, because of the firewall FW1 equip-
ment are in need of remote management, FW1-password
remains in FW1, at the same time, due to the T2 maintains
FW2 and S1, so T2 store password FW2 password and
S1 web password, in this environment, to ban other flow
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Table 1. Network Services in the Experiment Environment
Web Service Web Services’s Role Service Support Equipment Service Dependent Port Service Password
T2 manager Remote Management equipment T2 T2 E0 None
FW1 manager Remote management equipment FW1 FW1 E2 FW1 password
FW2 manager Remote management equipment FW2 FW2 E2 FW2 password
S1 web Web services in server S1 S1 S1 E0 S1 web password
S2 web Web services in server S2 S2 S2 E0 S2 web password
Figure 4. Experiment Environment Topology
of information. But we can know, an attacker can through
the multiple domain joint attack, which can obtain the se-
curity information stored on the server S2, a possible attack
path is as follows:
First, attacker enter space P2 and obtain the management
service password FW1 password of firewall FW1;
Second, use device T1 or D1 to access the management
service of FW1, add access control list: allow T1 or D1 to
access the management service of T2, that is T2 manager;
Third, get the password FW2 password of firewall FW2
stored on T2 and the password S1 web password of service
S1 web through T2 manager;
Fourth, use T2 S1 port, access firewall FW2 manager, add
access control list: allow T1 or D1 access service S1 web
and S2 web;
Fifth, use T1 or D1 to access the service S1 web and get
the password S2 web password of S2 web, at this point,
the attacker’s higher permissions have been obtained.
At last, the attacker can use T1 or D1 to access the
service S2 web to get the security information by the
S2 web password.
In this process, three key firewall security policy changes
are involved: on firewall FW1, T1 or D1 are allowed to
access T2’s management service T2 manager; On firewall
FW2, allow T1 or D1 access to service S1 web; On firewall
FW2, allow T1 or D1 access to the service S2 web.
4.2. Experiment Process
During the experiment, an agent(attacker) is introduced, lo-
cated in the outermost space, and then, in the environment
shown in Figure 4, for three key security policies (on fire-
wall FW1, T1 or D1 are allowed to access T2’s manage-
ment service T2 manager; On firewall FW2, allow T1 or
D1 to access service S1 web; On firewall FW2, allow T1
or D1 to access the service S2 web). Randomly add 0 or
more security policies, and respectively calculate the aver-
age attack action length of the attacker to obtain security
information when the number of key security policies is
different (if the attack action length exceeds 10000, it will
be forced to quit, which means that the attack is unsuccess-
ful, otherwise, the action sequence length of the first time
to obtain the security information will be recorded).
According to the malicious action analysis model, accord-
ing to the DDPG algorithm, define the corresponding state,
action, reward, etc. The relevant settings are as follows:
On the set of state, with a length of 106 vector to repre-
sent a state of different position on the value of the vector
may users, respectively from the spaces, the ports, services
or information, in setting a state vector, if in the state, the
attacker exists, will be to the attacker’s value is set to 1,
otherwise 0. If the attacker is in a certain space, the value
representing that space is set to 1; otherwise, it is 0. If
the attacker uses a port, set the value representing the port
to 1, otherwise 0; If the attacker is connected to a service,
set the value representing the service to 1, otherwise 0; If
the attacker obtain security information, set the value rep-
resenting that information to 1, otherwise 0.
Attackers have different action in different states. For ex-
ample, when the attacker can dominate the management
service FW1 manage of FW1 in the current state, he can
add the corresponding access control list for firewall FW1
in the current state. Otherwise, he cannot add the access
control list for FW1. For example, if the attacker is able
to access the service S1 web in the current state and has
the password S1 web password, he can dominate the ser-
vice. If it has access to the service S1 web, but does not
have the password S1 web password, he cannot dominate
the service.
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In terms of the reward setting, different reward are set for
the attacker according to the degree of the completion of the
attack path. Among them, when the attacker can dominate
the management service FW1 manage of FW1, its current
reward is 100. When the attacker can dominate the man-
agement service FW2 manage of F2, its current state re-
ward is 200. When the attacker obtains the administrative
service password S1 web password of the S1 web, the re-
ward is set to 300. When the attacker obtains the adminis-
trative service password S2 web password of S2 web, the
reward is set to 400. When the attacker obtains the final
security message, the reward is set to 10000.
(a)
(b)
Figure 5. Attacker’s Reward Value Change in Training
4.3. Results and Discussions
Under the above conditions, learn 60 times in different en-
vironments respectively, and calculate the corresponding
attack sequence length. First of all, the attacks on a policy
for statistical learning process, the process of two typical
as shown in Figure 5, with the increasing the number of
training, R present a slow upward trend, until finally tend
to be convergent, it is in a learning process of RL, shows
that the proposed model can monitor to the attacker’s action
Number of security policies added
Attack 
path 
length
Figure 6. Length of Attack Path in Different Firewall Security
Policy
of gradually learning the characteristics of a attacker’s ac-
tion rule, and constantly improve its accuracy of judgment,
so as to verify the effectiveness of the proposed model is
presented in this paper.
Secondly, the length of the attack path under different secu-
rity configurations is calculated. According to the number
of policies added, the length of the possible attack path is
calculated, as shown in Figure 6.
From Figure 6, adding in the key security policies, the more
attacks the attackers more easily to the anticipated target,
this also from the side the important of the configure se-
curity. Besides, the length of the attacker’s attack path in
this configuration is used to measure the weakness of cy-
berspace, it also shows that the level of cyberspace config-
uration security can affect the attacker attack difficulty, this
verified the correctness of the proposed method.
5. Conclusion
Based on the current cyberspace configuration lack of mul-
tiple domains attack evaluation, we proposed the weakness
analysis of cyberspace configuration based on reinforce-
ment learning. Meanwhile, we has been learn about the
cyberspace weakness metrics, and finally has carried on
the experimental verification. This method can comprehen-
sively consider the mutual influence of the multiple domain
configuration in the cyberspace, and can take an intelligent
method to analysis the weakness of the cyberspace, which
has a strong practical value.
This paper analysis a typical cyberspace environment and
applies the reinforcement learning method to analysis of
cyberspace configuration, which has achieved better re-
sults. However, the cyberspace environment in this paper
is limited. In the next step, we hope to apply the reinforce-
ment learning to more cyberspace operation and mainte-
nance management, and achieve better results.
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